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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Clifford Daniel Singer timely appeals from the district court's judgment of
conviction. On appeal, Mr. Singer argues that the district court erred when it denied his
motion for a judgment of acquittal and that there was insufficient evidence for the jury to
convict him for burglary because there is no evidence in the record indicating that
Mr. Singer intended to permanently deprive Randy Willette of his property. Mr. Singer
also argues that there was insufficient evidence for the jury to convict him of burglary
because there was no evidence indicating that he had the intent to commit the offense
of theft when he entered Mr. Willette's home.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Singer was renting a room from Mr. Willette and he left Mr. Willette a $250
rental

deposit.

(Presentence Investigation

Report (hereinafter,

PSI),

pp.2-3.)

Mr. Singer decided to move on short notice and asked Mr. Willette to return his deposit.
(PSI, pp.2-3.) Mr. Willette did not return the deposit, so Mr. Singer decided to take
some of Mr. Willette's personal property 1 as a form of collateral. (PSI, pp.2-3.) After
Mr. Willette discovere~ that some of his personal property was missing he called the
police. (PSI, pp.2-3.)
Mr. Singer was charged, by Information, with burglary. (R., pp.41-42.) The case
proceeded to a jury trial, and the State provided three witnesses.

The first witness,

Mr. Willette, testified that he was not present in his home when Mr. Singer took his

1

This property included, among other things, a rain stick, a snare drum, a peacock
lamp, an antique whiskey jug, and a cougar skull. (PSI, p.3.)

1

(Tr. Vol. 11, p.28, L.17 - p.29, L.21 .)2 Mr. Willette testified that Mr. Singer

property.

called him after he had taken his property and demanded his deposit money. (Tr. Vol.
II, p.24, Ls.1-11.) Mr. Willette returned Mr. Singer's phone call and he left a message
indicating that he was willing to return Mr. Singer's deposit if Mr. Singer was willing to
return Mr. Willette's property. (Tr. VoL 11, p.32, Ls.3-10.)
The State's second witness, Danielle Partyka, who lived with both Mr. Willette
and Mr. Singer, witnessed Mr. Singer move out of Mr. Willette's home. (Tr. Vol. 11, p.42,
L.13 - p.44, L.22.) She testified that she was in her bedroom when Mr. Singer arrived at
Mr. Willette's residence. (Tr. Vol. II, p.53, Ls.17-25.) Mr. Singer asked Ms. Partyka if
she knew where Mr. Willette had left his deposit money and she said no. (Tr. Vol. II,
p.54, Ls.1-20.) Ms. Partyka testified that it was after Mr. Singer realized that Mr. Willette
had not returned his deposit, that he told her he was going to take Mr. Willette's
property to use as collateral. (Tr. Vol. II, p.54, L.21 - p.55, L.2, p.56, Ls.4-8, p.59, L.22 p.60, L.2.)
The State's third witness, Officer Mortensen, responded to a theft report and met
Mr. Willette about half a city block from Mr. Singer's knew residence. (Tr. Vol. II, p.63,
Ls.6-23.)

Officer Mortensen then walked over to Mr. Singer's new residence and

started talking to Mr. Singer. (Tr. Vol. 11, p.64, Ls.5-20.) Mr. Singer candidly told Officer
Mortensen that he had taken some of Mr. Willette's property as collateral for his deposit
money.

(Tr. Vol. II, p.64, Ls.21-25, p.67, Ls.11-23.)

Mr. Singer invited Officer

Mortensen into his new residence and showed him Mr. Willette's property. (Tr. Vol. II,

2

There are two volumes of the trial transcript. For ease of citation, this brief will
reference the volume which contains the court's opening, voir dire, etc . .. , as Volume I.
The volume with the State's case in chief and the sentencing hearing will be cited to as
Volume II.
2

p.65, Ls.1-17.) Mr. Singer told Officer Mortensen that he was planning on retuning
Mr. Willette's property, which he did. (Tr. Vol. 11, p.69, Ls.3-4, p.69, Ls.14-23.)
After the State rested its case, Mr. Singer moved for a judgment of acquittal,
arguing that the State did not present any evidence indicating that Mr. Singer intended
to permanently deprive Mr. Willette of his property. (Tr. Vol. II, p.73, L.13 - p.74, L.3,
p.75, Ls.4-21.) The district court denied the motion, reasoning that it was a close issue,
but to grant the motion it would have to weigh the evidence which it thought was a "jury
issue." (Tr. Vol. 11, p.75, L.21 - p.76, L.5.) The jury rendered a guilty verdict on the
offense of burglary. (R., p.110.) Mr. Singer then renewed his motion for judgment of
acquittal, which he subsequently withdrew. (R., pp.117-118.)3
Thereafter, the district court imposed a unified sentence of three years, with one
and one-half years fixed, but suspended the sentence and placed Mr. Singer on
probation. (R., pp.123-127.)
Mr. Singer timely appealed. (R., pp.135-137.)

3

Mr. Singer's motion to withdraw his renewed motion for judgment of acquittal and the
district court's order granting that motion are not currently in the record on appeal.
Accordingly, a motion to augment his been filed concurrently herewith.
3

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Singer's motion for judgment of acquittal,
and was there sufficient evidence from which a rational juror could conclude, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that Mr. Singer took Mr. Willette's property with the intent to
permanently deprive Mr. Willette of possession or use of his property and that he had
the specific intent to commit the offense of theft when he entered Mr. Willette's
residence?

4

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Singer's Motion For Judgment Of Ac 1uittal,
And There Was Insufficient Evidence From Which A Rational Juror Could Conclude.
Beyond A Reasonable Doubt, That Mr. Singer Took Mr. Willette's Property With The
Intent To Permanently Deprive Mr. Willette Of Possession Or Use Of His Property And
There Was Insufficient Evidence From Which A Rational .Juror Could Conclude, Beyond
A Reasonable Doubt, That ~Ar. Singer Had The Specific Intent To Commit The Offense
Of Theft When He Entered Mr. Willette's Residence
A.

Introduction
The State's burglary case was based on the premise that Mr. Singer had the

specific intent to commit the offense of theft when he entered Mr. Willette's residence.
To be found guilty of the offense of theft, Mr. Singer must have had the intent to
permanently deprive Mr. Willette of his property. At the jury trial, the State failed to
provide evidence indicating that Mr. Singer intended to permanently deprive Mr. Willette
of his property.

All of the State's witnesses testified that Mr. Singer was using

Mr. Willette's property as collateral for his deposit.

Mr. Singer also argues that there was insufficient evidence from which a rational
juror could conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Mr. Singer had the specific intent
to commit the offense of theft when he entered Mr. Willette's residence.

The only

evidence adduced at the jury trial concerning this point was Ms. Partyka's testimony that
Mr. Singer developed the intent to take Mr. Willette's property after he realized that
Mr. Willette had not returned the deposit money.

8.

The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Singer's Motion For Judgment
Of Acquittal, And There Was Insufficient Evidence From Which A Rational
Juror Could Conclude, Beyond A Reasonable Doubt That Mr. Singer Took
Mr. Willette's Property With The Intent To Permanently Deprive Mr. Willette Of
Possession Or Use Of His Property
Under Idaho Criminal Rule 29(a), a judgment of acquittal shall be entered if the

evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction of the offense charged. I.C.R. 29(a). An
5

Idaho Criminal Rule 29 motion must be denied if there is substantial and competent
evidence sufficient to support a guilty verdict.

State v. Hoilon, 136 Idaho 499, 501

(Ct. App. 2001 ). Review of a denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal requires the
appellate court to independently consider the evidence in the record and determine
whether reasonable minds would conclude that the defendant's guilt as to each material
element of the offense was proven beyond a reasonable doubt
Idaho 736, 572 P.2d 170 (1977).

State v. Erwin, 98

In making this determination, all reasonable

inferences are taken in favor of the state. State v. O'Campo, 103 Idaho 62, 644 P.2d
985 (Ct. App. 1982).
Appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence is limited in scope. State v.
Taylor, 157 Idaho 186,

335 P.3d 31, 34 (2014). An appellate court only inquires

into "whether there is substantial evidence upon which a reasonable jury could have
found that the State met its burden of proving the essential elements of the charged
crimes beyond a reasonable doubt."

Id. at _ , 335 P.3d at 35 (internal quotation

marks omitted). Substantial evidence is "relevant evidence which a reasonable mind
might accept to support a conclusion." Id. at_, 335 P.3d at 35 (internal quotation
marks omitted).

"[T]he Court is required to consider the evidence in the light most

favorable to the State, but will not substitute its judgment for that of the jury on issues of
witness credibility, weight of the evidence, or reasonable inferences to be drawn from
the evidence." Id. at_, 335 P.3d at 35 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The due process guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution requires that a conviction be supported by legally sufficient evidence. See

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315-16 (1979).

6

Sufficient evidence is "evidence

necessary to convince a trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt of the existence of
every element of the offense." Id. at 316.
Mr. Singer's conviction for burglary was based on I.C. § 18-1401, which provides,
"Every person who enters any house, room, apartment, tenement, shop, warehouse,
store, mill, barn, stable, outhouse, or other building, tent, vessel, vehicle, trailer, airplane
or railroad car, with intent to commit any theft or any felony, is guilty of burglary."
LC.§ 18-1401. The offense of theft is codified in I.C. § 18-2401(1), which provides "A
person steals property and commits theft when, with intent to deprive another of
property or to a propriate the same to himself or to a third person, he wrongfully takes,
obtains or withholds such property from an owner thereof." I.C. § 18-2401 (1) (emphasis
added). The district court provided the following jury instruction which mirrors the Idaho
Criminal Jury Instruction number 562:
INSTRUCTION NO. 20
The phrase "intent to deprive" means:
a. The intent to withhold property or cause it to be withheld from an
owner permanently or for so extended a period or under such
circumstances that the major portion of its economic value or benefit is
lost to such owner; or
b. The intent to dispose of the property in such manner or under
such circumstances as to render it unlikely that an owner will recover such
property.
The phrase "intent to appropriate" means:
a. The intent to exercise control over property, or to aid someone
other than the owner to exercise control over it, permanently or for so
extended a period of time or under such circumstances as to acquire the
major portion of its economic value or benefit; or
b. The intent to dispose of the property for the benefit of oneself or
someone other than the owner.
(R., p.107.)
7

In this case, there is insufficient evidence to support Mr. Singer's conviction for
burglary, because there is no evidence upon which a reasonable jury could have found
that the State met its burden of proving that he intended to permanently deprive
Mr. Willette of his property. All of the evidence adduced at trial indicated that Mr. Singer
was temporarily holding Mr. Willette's property until Mr. Willette reimbursed Mr. Singer
his deposit of $250. Mr. Willette testified that Mr. Singer called him after he had taken
the property.

(Tr., Vol. II, p.15, L.19 - p.16, L.2.)

Mr. Willette also testified that he

returned Mr. Singer's call and left a message indicating that he would return
Mr. Singer's deposit money if Mr. Singer would return Mr. Willette's property. (Tr. Vol.
II, p.32, Ls.3-10.) While he was never informed about a specific date, Mr. Willette knew
that Mr. Singer was planning on moving to a new residence before he actually moved.
(Tr. Vol. 11, p.22, L.19 - p.23, L.6.) Mr. Willette also knew where to find Mr. Singer and
his property, after Mr. Singer moved. (Tr., Vol. 11, p.32, Ls.16-25.) In fact, Mr. Willette's
property was returned shortly after Mr. Singer was contacted by Officer Mortensen.
(Tr. Vol. 11, p.69, Ls.14-23.) Mr. Singer's behavior with Mr. Willette on the day of the
offense indicates he intended to return Mr. Willette's property.
Additionally, the only witness who observed Mr. Singer remove some of
Mr. Willette's property testified the Mr. Singer intended to return the property to
Mr. Willette. Mr. Partyka testified that she was in her bedroom when Mr. Singer arrived
at Mr. Willette's residence.

(Tr. Vol. 11, p.53, Ls.20-25.) When Mr. Singer contacted

Ms. Partyka he first asked her if she knew where Mr. Willette left his deposit money.
(Tr. Vol. 11, p.54, Ls.1-16.) Ms. Partyka said she did not know where it was and she
testified that it was at that point when Mr. Singer "told me that he was going to steal
Randy's karaoke machine because the money was not there." (Tr. Vol. II, p.54, Ls.218

24.)

When asked if Mr. Singer was taking Mr. Willette's belongs ·'as collateral,"

Ms. Partyka said, "Pretty much, yeah."

(Tr. Vol. 11, p.55, Ls.22-25.)

Mr. Singer's

defense counsel asked if he actually declared that he was taking the items for collateral
Ms. Partyka testified, "Well, when he first told me because the deposit wasn't there, it
was like he was going to take his karaoke machine because he didn't get his deposit
back when he asked for it. But proceeded to not even take that. He was taking other
items." (Tr. Vol. 11, p.56, Ls.3-8.) On redirect, the State asked Ms. Partyka to clarify if
Mr. Singer said he was taking the items as collateral or stealing them. (Tr. Vol. II, p.59,
Ls.20-25.) Ms. Partyka testified, "He told me he was going to steal it, but [I thought he]
was taking it as collateral. ... " (Tr. Vol. II, p.60, Ls.1-2.) This evidence indicates that
Mr. Singer intended to take temporary procession of Mr. Willette's property and that he
planned to return the property after he received his deposit money.
Mr. Singer's behavior and statements to Officer Mortensen, indicated that
Mr. Singer did not intend to permanently deprive Mr. Willette of his property.

When

Mr. Singer was contacted by Officer Mortensen, he "admitted that he took the items
over a dispute of having his deposit returned. of $250 from Randy Willette." (Tr. Vol. II,
p.64, Ls.21-25.) Officer Mortensen testified, "Clifford invited me in to show me where
the items were. The peacock lamp and the drum were inside the back seat of the car.
And then he took me up to his bedroom and showed me the rest of the items." (Tr. Vol.
II, p.65, Ls.1-8.) When Officer Mortensen was asked if Mr. Singer had taken the items
as collateral until Mr. Willette returned the deposit, Officer Mortensen testified, "That
was my understanding, yes."

(Tr. Vol. 11, p.67, Ls.20-23.)

occurred at trial:

9

The following dialogue

Q:

Okay, Mr. Singer actually told you that he was in the middle of
loading the property up into that vehicle at that point; is that
correct?

A:

I don't remember that specifically, but he did mention that he
planned on retuning it

Q:

And that he was under the belief that Randy was going to return
the deposit money with the return of the items. Did he tell you that
as well?

A:

Something along those lines.

(Tr. Vol. II, p.68, L.25 - p.69, L.8.}
Officer Mortensen also testified that Mr. Singer was cooperative, invited him into
Mr. Singer house, took him upstairs to his bedroom, and answered all of his questions.
(Tr. Vol. 11, p.68, Ls.4-14.)

This also indicates that Mr. Singer intended to return

Mr. Willette's property.
Moreover, Mr. Willette quickly recovered all of his items after Officer Mortensen
contacted Mr. Singer. The following dialogue occurred between Mr. Singer's defense
counsel and Officer Mortensen:
Q:

And you were able to summons [Mr. Willette] to [Mr. Singer's]
residence at some point; is that correct?

A:

Yeah. I was able to just quickly walk to him and say, "Let's get your
stuff."

Q:

And he was able to regain possession on the items?

A:

He was.

Q:

And as far as you're aware, that property was returned at that time;
right?

A:

To my knowledge, yes.

10

(Tr. Vol. II, p.69, Ls.14-23.) As such, Mr. Singer did not do anything around Officer
Mortensen which would indicate that he intended to permanently deprive Mr. Willette of
his property.
After Mr. Singer realized that Mr. Willette had not returned his deposit he took
some of Mr. Willette's property as collateral for his deposit.

Mr. Singer then cailed

Mr. Willette and left a message on his phone. Mr. Willette then called Mr. Singer and
left a message indicating that he would return the deposit money if Mr. Singer would
return the property.

The only witness who observed Mr. Singer taking Mr. Willette's

property, Ms. Partyka, testified that Mr. Singer temporarily took the property with the
intent to return it to Mr. Willette. Officer Mortensen's testimony was consistent with the
foregoing. There was no evidence in the record which a reasonable jury could use as
the basis for the conclusion that Mr. Singer had the intent to permanently deprive
Mr. Willette of his property.

It follows that the district court erred when it denied

Mr. Singer's motion for a judgment of acquittal and that there was insufficient evidence
to conclude that Mr. Singer had the intent to permanently deprive Mr. Willette of his
property.

C.

There Was Insufficient Evidence From Which A Rational Juror Could Conclude,
Beyond A Reasonable Doubt, That Mr. Singer Had The Specific Intent To
Commit The Offense Of Theft When He Entered Mr. Willette's Residence
The standards controlling a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence were set

forth in Section IB, supra, and are incorporated herein.
Mr. Singer's conviction for burglary was based on I.C. § 18-1401, which provides,
"Every person who enters any house, room, apartment, tenement, shop, warehouse,
store, mill, barn, stable, outhouse, or other building, tent, vessel, vehicle, trailer, airplane
or railroad car, with intent to commit any theft or any felony, is guilty of burglary."
11

I.C. § 18-1401. Mr. Singer developed the intent to hold the property as collateral after
his initial entry into Mr. Willette's residence. The only testimony as to Mr. Singer's intent
when he entered Mr. Willette's home was provided by Ms. Partyka. She testified that
she was in her bedroom when Mr. Singer arrived at Mr. Willette's residence. (Tr. VoL II,
p.53, Ls.17-25.) While Ms. Partyka was in her bedroom, Mr. Singer asked Ms. Partyka
if she knew where Mr. Willette had left his deposit money and she said no. (Tr. Vol. II,
p.54, Ls.1-20.) Ms. Partyka testified that it was at that point in time when Mr. Singer
said he was going to take Mr. Willette's karaoke machine. (Tr. Vol. II, p.45, Ls.21-24.)
This statement was made to Ms. Partyka before Mr. Singer started moving property out
of Mr. Willette's home. (Tr. Vol. II, p.44, Ls.7-16, p.45, L.6 ·· p.46, L.2.) Ms. Partyka
then took a shower and after her shower she noticed that some of Mr. Willette's
property had been removed. (Tr. Vol. II, p.46, L. 7 - p.47, L.15.) However, Ms. Partyka
testified that Mr. Singer did not take Mr. Willette's karaoke machine. (Tr. Vol. 11, p.54,
L.24 - p.55, L.5, p.56, Ls.4-8.)
There are two points which can be adduced from the testimony of Ms. Partyka.
First, Mr. Singer did not say he was going to take Mr. Willette's property until he
confirmed with Ms. Partyka that Mr. Willette did not return his deposit. Since Mr. Singer
had this discussion near Ms. Partyka's bedroom he was already inside Mr. Willette's
home when he developed the intent to take Mr. Willette's property. Second, Mr. Singer
did not have a predetermined plan because he initially told Ms. Partyka that he was
going to take Mr. Willette's Karaoke machine, but then took different items. This is an
indicator that Mr. Singer was making hasty decisions after he had already entered the
residence without the requisite intent.

12

In sum, the evidence in the record indicates that Mr. Singer first decided to take
Mr. Wiilette's property after he learned that Mr. Willette did not return the deposit. Since
Mr. Singer was speaking with Ms. Partyka while she was in her bedroom, this decision
was made after Mr. Singer had entered Mr. Willette's home. It follows that Mr. Singer
did not have the intent to commit the offense of theft before he entered Mr. Willette's
property and, therefore, there was no evidence from which a rational juror could
conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Mr. Singer was guilty of the offense of
burglary.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Singer respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction for burglary
and remand this case to the district court.
DATED this 5 th day of March, 2015 .
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SHAWN F. WILK ~ON
Deputy State Appell'ate Public Defender
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